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Commercial Law
By HAROLD R. WEINBERG*
In Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,' decided during 1974, the
United States Supreme Court announced a significant change
in the manner in which it would determine whether creditors'
statutory prejudgment remedies which involve an application
of state authority are constitutional under the due process'
clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 This portion of the Sur-
vey will consider this change in judicial attitude.
To fully appreciate the significance of Mitchell it is neces-
sary to consider two prior decisions of the Court, decided in
1969 and 1972, which suggested that the provisional remedies
in many jurisdictions, including Kentucky,3 were not constitu-
tional under federal due process standards. The earliest of
these decisions was Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.'
In Sniadach, the petitioner's wages were frozen pursuant
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B. 1966, Western Reserve
University; J.D. 1969, Case Western Reserve University; LL.M. 1975, University of
Illinois.
1 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
2 Statutory prejudgment remedies which involve an exercise of state power in-
clude garnishment, attachment, and replevin. They are often referred to as "provi-
sional" remedies. Since these remedies involve the use of court process and state power
there is normally no problem with respect to their meeting the state action requirement
of the fourteenth amendment: "No State shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Thus, provi-
sional remedies may be constitutionally distinguishable from creditors' "self-help"
remedies which are validated by state statute but which do not involve an exercise of
state power. See note 16 and accompanying text infra.
3 There are several Kentucky and federal opinions dealing with the constitution-
ality of Kentucky provisional and "self-help" remedies. See Gary v. Darnell, 505 F.2d
741 (6th Cir. 1974) (Ky. REv. STAT. 355.9-503 [hereinafter cited as KRSI constitu-
tional); Cockeral v. Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ky. 1974) (KRS 376.280(1)
unconstitutional but KRS 376.270 constitutional); Thompson v. Keesee, 375 F. Supp.
195 (E.D. Ky. 1974) (KRS 425.129 unconstitutional); Holt v. Brown, 336 F. Supp. 2
(W.D. Ky. 1971) (KRS 383.040, .050 unconstitutional); Dresser Indus., Inc. v. K-
Service, Inc., No. 73-2363 (Fayette Cir. Ct. 6th Div., June 18, 1974) (KRS 425.185
constitutional); Op. ATr'Y GEN. 74-865 (Ky. 1974) (KRS 376.280(1) unconstitutional
but KRS 370.275 constitutional); Op. ATr'Y GzN. 73-24 (Ky. 1973) (KRS 383.040, .050
unconstitutional); Op. AT'y GEN. 70-40, 70-47 (Ky. 1970) (KRS 425.185 constitu-
tional). See also Duo-Therm Div., Motor Wheel Corp. v. Sheargrain, Inc., 504 S.W.2d
689 (Ky. 1974).
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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to a Wisconsin statutory procedure which permitted a creditor,
without notice to the debtor and without a pre-or postseizure
hearing, to obtain an in rem prejudgment seizure of a debtor's
wages. Under the procedure, a clerk of court would issue a
summons on the garnishee at the request of the creditor. The
creditor had ten days to serve a summons on the debtor after
service of the summons on the garnishee.' The debtor's wages
could be unfrozen if a court ultimately determined in the main
action that the creditor's claim was without merit. But until
such a determination the debtor would be deprived of the use
of his wages with no opportunity to be heard. The petitioner
challenged the procedure on the grounds that it did not satisfy
the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, held for the
petitioner. The Court acknowledged that such a summary pro-
cedure might meet the requirements of due process in extraor-
dinary situations requiring special protection for the interests
of the state or creditors seeking a seizure of wages, but found
no such situation present.' Noting the impact that a prejudg-
ment wage garnishment could have on a wage earner and his
dependents and the leverage which it gave to the creditor, the
Court concluded that there was an obvious taking of property
requiring, under fundamental principles of due process, notice
to the debtor and a prior hearing. Since the Wisconsin statute
did not provide these safeguards, it was unconstitutional.
Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in a separate opinion, mak-
ing explicit his view that the property taken was the peti-
tioner's use of the wages during the period that they were
frozen, which was not a de minimis interest. He also stated that
due process could be afforded only by the kind of notice and
hearing which established at least the probable validity of the
underlying debt before the debtor's use of his property is re-
stricted.
In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Black argued that
the majority had held the Wisconsin procedure unconstitu-
tional because they viewed it to be based on an unwise state
policy, and that such a holding amounted to an unauthorized
5 In fact, the garnishee and the debtor were served on the same day in Sniadach.
Id. at 338.
1 The Wisconsin statute was not limited to such situations. Id. at 339.
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judicial usurpation of state legislative power. Justice Black also
observed that a postgarnishment hearing was available in Wis-
consin through a motion to dismiss the garnishment
proceeding.
The broad application of the due process principles
enunciated in Sniadach was uncertain for at least two reasons.
First, Sniadach represented a departure by the Supreme Court
from its earlier decisions which had suggested that federal due
process requirements could be met by statutory procedures
providing for a hearing before a taking becomes final.7 Second,
Justice Douglas' emphasis on the peculiar nature of wages of-
fered a basis for distinguishing the procedure in Sniadach from
those which authorized the prejudgment seizure of other kinds
of property. Not surprisingly, the lower courts divided on the
broad precedential value of Sniadach.s The confusion did not
last long, however, because in 1972 the Supreme Court seemed
to clearly signal, in Fuentes v. Shevin,9 that other summary
creditor's remedies which were applicable to other kinds of
property would also have to afford notice and a preseizure hear-
ing in order to be constitutional.o
In Fuentes the appellants alleged that the prejudgment
replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania were violative of
the fourteenth amendment's due process guarantees. The stat-
utes had been invoked by creditors to obtain the seizure of
consumer chattels in which the creditors had retained
nonpossessory interests to secure payment." Under the Florida
See, e.g., McInnes v. McKay, 279 U.S. 820 (1929) (prejudgment attachment for
a private purpose); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett,-277 U.S. 29 (1928) (seizure for a
public purpose). See generally Note, Garnishment of Wages Prior to Judgment Is a
Denial of Due Process: The Sniadach Case and Its Implications for Related Areas of
the Law, 68 MiCH. L. REv. 986, 989-90 (1970). The Sniadach majority distinguished
these precedents in that they involved extraordinary situations and because the instant
case involved the seizure of a debtor's wages. 395 U.S. at 339-40.
1 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 72 n.5. See generally Williams, Creditor's
Prejudgment Remedies: Expanding Strictures on Traditional Rights, 25 U. FLA. L.
REV. 60, 83-87, 96-98 (1972).
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
' One case decided by the Supreme Court after Sniadach and before Fuentes
extended Sniadach notions of due process to the taking away of a driver's license by
the state. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits without a prior hearing).
" There was one exception to this pattern. The deputy sheriff, who was the hus-
band of one of the appellants, used the statute to seize the belongings of his son over
whom he was attempting to gain custody. 407 U.S. at 72.
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statute, any person whose goods or chattels were wrongfully
detained by any other person could obtain a writ of replevin.
The statute did not require the creditor, prior to the seizure,
to make a convincing showing of wrongful detention. Rather, a
bare conclusory assertion of lawful entitlement by the creditor
in a complaint initiating an action for repossession, and the
posting of a bond in at least double the amount of the property
to be replevied, allowed the court clerk to issue a writ com-
manding the sheriff to replevy the goods and summon the
debtor to answer. The debtor could reclaim possession of the
goods seized within 72 hours after the seizure by posting a bond
in an amount double the value of the property. If such a bond
was not posted, the property would be transferred to the credi-
tor. There was no opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the
creditor's claim until the trial of the repossession action. The
Pennsylvania statute was substantially the same except that it
did not require the initiation of a repossession action by the
creditor. The debtor would have to initiate an action himself
if he was to ever obtain a hearing. In addition, the Pennsyl-
vania statute required only an affidavit as to the value of the
property to be replevied, rather than an allegation of lawful
entitlement.
The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Stewart,
considered the primary question in the case as one of whether
the statutes were constitutionally defective in failing to provide
for a hearing at a meaningful time and concluded that only a
preseizure hearing could prevent arbitrary or mistaken taking
of property.1 2 The deterrent effect of the statutes' requirement
that the creditor post a bond was not sufficient to save the
statutes because this merely tested the creditor's belief in his
own rights. That the debtor could post a bond and regain
possession of his goods and that he lacked full title to the goods
did not render the taking so insignificant as to obviate the
necessity for a prior hearing. The Court did recognize, as it had
in Sniadach, that there were extraordinary situations in which
postseizure notice and hearing could be justified. 3 However,
12 Id. at 80. The court indicated that the hearing could be waived by the debtor.
Id. at 82. However, none of the debtors in Fuentes made an effective waiver of his due
process rights. Id. at 94-95.
,1 The statutes were not limited to extraordinary situations.
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the Court indicated that such an extraordinary situation would
not normally exist when the state intervenes in a private dis-
pute."
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice White (who was joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun) argued that the
majority had not struck an appropriate balance between the
competing interests of creditors and debtors. By his analysis,
practical and economic considerations such as a creditor-
businessman's natural preference for a nonlitigious resolution
of disputes with customer-debtors and the cost of instituting a
replevin action and posting a bond insured that most replevin
actions would be well founded and made a preseizure hearing
unnecessary. Furthermore, creditors, whose equity in the prop-
erty might exceed that of their debtors, had a legitimate inter-
est in preventing the additional use and deterioration of the
property after a default had occurred.
The decision in Fuentes greatly increased the amount of
litigation involving challenges to the constitutionality of credi-
tor's prejudgment remedies.1 5 The attacks were not limited to
statutes involving significant state action in the form of court
procedures and the use of state power to take debtor's property.
"Self-help" remedies, such as a secured creditor's post-default
right under the Uniform Commercial Code to take possession
of and sell collateral without judicial process, were also chal-
lenged."8 However, certain aspects of Fuentes suggested that its
value as a precedent might be short-lived. Although it cast a
shadow over the provisional and "self-help" remedies in many
jurisdictions," Fuentes was a 4-3 decision in which Justices
Powell and Rehnquist had not participated. And although the
" Id. at 92. The Court suggested that such extraordinary circumstances demand-
ing prompt action might exist in a case in which a creditor could show an immediate
danger that this collateral might be concealed or destroyed, if the statute was narrowly
drawn to deal with such situations. Even then, a state official would have to participate
in the decision to issue the writ. Id. at 93.
" See generally West, Fuentes Revisited, 80 COM. L.J. 10 (1975).
" See UNIFORM C0O MRCArL CODE §§ 9-503, 9-504. Other creditor's remedies not
requiring judicial process that were challenged included garagemen's liens, landlord's
liens, and innkeeper's liens. See generally Comment, Fuentes v. Shevin: The Applica-
tion of Constitutional Due Process to the Garagemen's Lien in Kentucky, 62 Ky. L.J.
1133, 1134 (1974); Clark and Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes, and Beyond: The Creditor
Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. Rev. 335 (1973).
11 See note 3 supra for Kentucky cases.
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Fuentes requirements of notice and a prior hearing would be
easy to apply in determining whether a particular creditor's
prejudgment remedy was constitutional, it was not clear that
the decision gave adequate protection to the interests of credi-
tors and appropriate consideration to the impact that these
safeguards might have on the availability and cost of credit.'8
The majority in Fuentes had considered the interests of credi-
tors, but had concluded that "[t]he requirement of notice and
an opportunity to be heard raises no impenetrable barrier to
the taking of a person's possessions"'" and that reducing costs
did not justify overriding due process rights.2' Thus, it was not
a total surprise when, in June of 1974, the Fuentes dissenters
became part of the majority in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,"
which upheld the constitutionality of a prejudgment creditor's
statutory remedy that did not afford notice and a prior hearing
to the debtor.
In Mitchell, a Louisiana judge had ordered, with neither
notice nor prior hearing, the sequestration of a debtor's con-
sumer goods on the application of a creditor who claimed that
the goods were subject to a vendor's lien. Naturally, the debtor
challenged the seizure on the grounds that he was denied the
fairness guaranteed to him by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution.22 After stating the
essential facts, the majority opinion, written by Justice White,
,1 Justice White was concerned with Fuentes' impact on the availability and cost
of credit. 407 U.S. at 103. See generally Williams, Creditor's Prejudgement Remedies:
Expanding Structures or Traditional Rights, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 60, 101 (1972); John-
son, Denial of Self-Help Repossession: An Economic Analysis, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 82
(1973); Dauer & Gelhoal, The Economics of Constitutionalized Repossession: A Cri-
tique for Professor Johnson and a Partial Reply, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 116 (1973).
" 407 U.S. at 81.
21Id. at 92 n.29.
21 416 U.S. 600 (1974). See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (due
process in termination of public employment).
" The debtor also challenged the seizure under the due process clause of Louis-
iana's state constitution. One of the author's students in a consumer credit seminar
given last fall, Charles R. Keeton, searched out cases in which the issue of the constitu-
tionality of a prejudgment creditor's remedy under state constitutional provisions was
considered. He was able to locate only one case, Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 295
A.2d 402, 411 (N.J. Super. 1972), which dismissed the argument without discussion
and a single law review student comment, Comment, Self-Help Repossession: Fuentes
and Judicial Process, 46 TEMPLE L.Q. 540, n.66 (1974), which briefly discussed the
question.
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wasted no time in indicating that notice and a hearing would
no longer always be required before a creditor could constitu-
tionally take property from a debtor under nonextraordinary
circumstances through the use of state power. Instead, resolu-
tion of the due process issue would henceforth emphasize the
interest of the seller in preserving his collateral after a default
23
and the interests of the state furthered by the provisional rem-
edy. Such state interests could include those of providing reme-
dies for protection of creditors and avoiding the breaches of the
peace which could result if creditors were required to resort to
"self-help" remedies.24
The majority considered several aspects of the Louisiana
procedure significant in determining that it struck an appropri-
ate balance between these competing interests:
1. The writ of sequestration would not issue on the mere
conclusory allegations of ownership or possessory right. In-
stead, the writ would issue only after the nature of the claim,
the amount thereof, and the grounds relied upon for the issu-
ance of the writ clearly appeared from specific facts shown by
a verified petition or affidavit.
2. The showing of these facts was required to be made to a
judge in an ex parte hearing and the writ would issue only on
his authorization.2
3. The creditor seeking the writ was required to file a bond
sufficient to protect the debtor against all damages if the
sequestration was shown to be improvident.
4. The statute entitled the debtor to immediately seek dis-
solution of the writ, which would be ordered unless the credi-
tor was able to substantiate the grounds which resulted in
issuance of the writ. If the creditor could not meet this burden
the property would be returned to the debtor who would be
entitled to damages, including attorney's fees.
5. The debtor could, with or without moving to dissolve the
sequestration, regain possession of his property by filing a
bond.
2 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1974).
24 Id. at 604-605. Concerning "self-help" remedies, see note 16 and accompanying
text supra.
2 This was not required in all parishes. However, it was required and complied
with by the debtor in Orleans Parish where the writ was issued. See id. at 606 n.5.
Concerning the merits of requiring judicial participation see note 32 and accompqnying
text infra.
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The impact on a debtor of the deprivation without notice or
prior hearing did not, in the Court's view, outweigh a debtor's
possible inability to compensate the creditor should the value
of the goods as collateral be lost or diminished.
The Mitchell Court drew support for its holding from an
analysis of the position of a seller holding a lien on goods as
security for their payment. He is entitled to be paid, or to
foreclose on the goods if the buyer defaults. So long as the
buyer remains in possession he has the power to destroy, ab-
scond with, conceal, or transfer the goods. Even if the buyer
does none of these things, his mere postdefault use of the goods
for their intended purpose must result in a decline in their
value, and thus, a decline in the value of the seller's security.
Moreover, in Louisiana, where a transfer of possession of the
goods by the buyer to a third person could cut off the seller's
lien, notice and a prior hearing might seriously jeopardize a
seller's secured status.26
The Court also found support for its holding from the fact
that even in the preseizure hearing required by Fuentes a seller
would need only to establish the probable validity of his enti-
tlement to a prejudgment seizure of goods in which he had
retained an interest. The issues in such a determination would
be the existence of a debt, the lien, and an act of default, all
of which lend themselves to documentary proof through sworn
ex parte statements of the type required by the Louisiana pro-
cedure. These statements, along with the opportunity for an
immediate postseizure hearing and the creditor's normal inter-
est in having the transaction go forward without interruption,
minimized the risk of the wrongful issuance of a writ.
The Mitchell majority attempted to reconcile its holding
with those in Sniadach and Fuentes. They viewed Sniadach as
raising special considerations relating to the seizure of a per-
son's basic source of income, his wages,2 and noted that the
procedure in that case did not contain the sort of safeguards
found in the Louisiana statute. Furthermore, the creditor in
26 In Uniform Commercial Code jurisdictions, such as Kentucky, the seller of
consumer goods who has retained a perfected security interest is not so exposed. See
UNIFORM COMMRCIAL CODE §§ 9-201, 9-301(1), 9-307(2). Even the unperfected-secured
seller receives some protection. Id. § 9-307(2).
21 The Fuentes majority was not willing to make a distinction between wages and
other kinds of property. See 407 U.S. 67, 88 (1972).
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Sniadach had no prior rights in the wages attached.2 Fuentes
involved replevin statutes which did not require judicial parti-
cipation in the decision to authorize the writ. Under those stat-
utes goods could be seized without verified statements contain-
ing the narrowly confined facts required under the Louisiana
statute, and an immediate postseizure hearing was not avail-
able. The majority also pointed out that its holding was consis-
tent with the pre-Sniadach decisions which had upheld stat-
utes validating prejudgment seizures without a prior hearing.
29
In a concurring opinion Justice Powell stated that the ma-
jority had justifiably overruled Fuentes to the extent that it
required an adversary proceeding before there could be a tem-
porary deprivation of property. In his view, the Louisiana stat-
ute provided a reasonable and fair procedure which facilitated
credit transactions and protected the interests of both creditor
and debtor.
Justice Stewart (joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall
and, in part, by Justice Brennan) dissented, arguing that the
majority's attempt to distinguish Fuentes could not be justi-
fied. In his view, the deprivation of property in both cases was
identical and the differences between the statutes in the two
cases made no constitutional difference, since the Louisiana
statute, just as those in Fuentes, permitted an ex parte seizure
without proper notice or hearing.
Regardless of whether Mitchell successfully distinguished
or actually overruled Fuentes, it makes clear that, for the time
being at least, notice and a prior hearing will not generally be
required to save a statutory prejudgment creditor's remedy
from a fourteenth amendment due process challenge. Instead,
notice and a hearing must be afforded sometime before the
seizure of a debtor's property can become final. A balancing
test, which takes into account the nature of the creditor's and
debtor's interests in the property seized, the state's interest in
providing the challenged remedy, and the nature of the prop-
erty, will be applied on a case by case basis to determine the
constitutionality of the remedy when the requisite state action
" Concerning this distinction, see Recent Development, Due Process, Replevin,
and Summary Remedies: What Sniadach Hath Wrought, 22 CATH. L. REv. 667, 675
(1972).
2, See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
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is present." If the procedural safeguards afforded by the statute
sufficiently protect the debtor's interest in not being wrongfully
deprived of his property, in light of the state's interests in
providing the remedy and the creditor's interest in summarily
taking possession, the remedy will be constitutional. A case
decided by the Supreme Court in January of 1975, North Geor-
gia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. ,' employs this balancing
test. The decision is of additional interest because it is the first
opinion by the Court to consider a prejudgment taking of the
assets of a commercial debtor.
Under the Georgia statute considered by the Supreme
Court in Di-Chem, plaintiffs in pending law suits were entitled
to the process of garnishment. The statute required that the
plaintiff make an affidavit before a court clerk stating the
amount claimed to be due in the pending action and that the
plaintiff has reason to apprehend the loss of all or part of the
amount unless the garnishment is issued. The plaintiff was also
required to file a bond for an amount double that sworn to be
due. The defendant could dissolve the garnishment by filing a
bond covering any judgment which might be rendered against
him in the action on the debt.
The respondent in Di-Chem used this procedure to seize
the petitioner's corporate bank account. Petitioner, after ob-
taining a dissolution of the garnishment by filing a bond, filed
a motion to have the garnishment dismissed on the grounds
that the garnishment procedure was not constitutional. The
Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner's contention.
The Court reasoned, on the authority of Fuentes, that the
statute involved the state in a constitutionally significant tak-
ing of property without notice or an opportunity for an early
hearing, and without the participation of a judicial officer.
Mitchell'could not save the Georgia statute because the affida-
vit required under the statute did not have to clearly set out
the facts entitling the creditor to the garnishment. Further-
more, the writ of garnishment could be issued without the par-
ticipation of a judge, and although the debtor would be de-
prived of the use of funds after the writ was served on the
30 See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
31 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975).
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garnishee, there was no provision for an early hearing at which
the creditor could be required to show probable cause.
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart rejoiced
that his conclusion in Mitchell-that Fuentes had been over-
ruled-was apparently erroneous, or at least, premature. Jus-
tice Powell also concurred, but objected to the majority opin-
ion's reliance on Fuentes, which might suggest that preseizure
notice and hearing requirements are still constitutionally man-
dated for prejudgment creditor's remedies involving the requi-
site state action. Justice Powell also did not agree with the
majority's suggestion that a judicial officer would be
constitutionally required to issue the writ of garnishment. In
his view, the debtor's real protection lay in the requirement of
a prompt postseizure hearing before a judge. 32 The lack of such
a hearing, he concluded, was the most serious deficiency in the
Georgia procedure.
Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Burger dissented on
several grounds, among which was the contention that the
Georgia statute afforded commercial entities sufficient due
process protection.
Di-Chem should not be read as resurrecting Fuentes. It did
not hold that notice and a preseizure hearing would be neces-
sary to save the *Georgia prejudgment garnishment statute, but
only that the statute did not afford sufficient due process.
2 Id. at 725 n.3. The three dissenters in Mitchell also questioned whether requir-
ing a judge to issue the writ, instead of a clerk, could make any constitutional differ-
ence. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 632 (1974) (dissent).
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